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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN 
SERVICES, and KAREN ADAMS, : PETITION FOR 
REHEARING 
Plaintiff and : 
Appellant, 
: No. 890690-CA 
v. 
HOWARD H. ADAMS, 
Defendant and 
Appellee : 
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, the Department of Human Services, by and through its 
counsel, Linda Luinstra, Assistant Attorney General, hereby 
submits this Petition for Rehearing. 
This case is on appeal to this Court from an Order of 
the Second District Court which Order agreed with the Defendant-
Appellee's position that he be allowed to provide in-kind child 
support in the form of a rental home, rather than cash, to the 
custodial parent on behalf of his children who were at the time 
receiving public assistance in the form of Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (hereinafter AFDC). 
BACKGROUND 
The Appellee, Mr. Adams, was divorced from his wife in 
1979. He and his wife had two children from that marriage. The 
divorce decree ordered the Defendant to pay $200 per month ($100 
per child) to his ex-wife for the benefit of his children. In 
1988, by agreement between Mr. and Mrs. Adams, Mrs. Adams began 
living "rent free" in a home owned by Mr. Adams, which home had a 
fair rental value of $350/month. This "agreement" was never 
adopted by the Court as a modification to the existing court 
Order until after the Department of Human Services, by and 
through its Office of Recovery Servicesf indicated to Mr. Adams 
that such "in-kind" child support payments were unallowed by 
state and federal law when the custodial parent and children are 
an "assistance unit" under the AFDC program. Mr. Adams' counsel 
subsequently scheduled an order to show cause hearing on the 
issue. The matter was heard by both the commissioner and 
district court judge for the Second District. The district 
court's Judgement was signed in October, 1989 and an appeal to 
this Court was taken by the Office of Recovery Services. 
Obviously, Mrs. Adams did not receive the home "rent-free" 
inasmuch as she was obligated by her agreement with Mr. Adams to 
forego her right to child support on behalf of the children in 
her custody. 
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POINTS OF LAW WHICH THIS COURT HAS OVERLOOKED 
AND MISAPPREHENDED 
I, The State Department of Human Services, Office of 
Recovery Servicesy has a federal obligation to enforce the 
mandates of the AFDC program in conformity with federal and state 
requirements. 
The Aid to Families with Dependent Children program is 
governed by Title IV-A and IV-D of the Social Security Act, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 601-676. The AFDC program is jointly funded by the 
federal government and participating states. As a condition of 
state participation in the AFDC program, the State is required to 
administer the program according to a plan approved by the United 
States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the federal 
agency charged with regulating the program. 42 U.S.C. § 602(b). 
The state plan must conform to federal requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 
602(a). A State's failure to comply with mandatory federal 
requirements would place the State's AFDC program in financial 
jeopardy. Under 42 U.S.C. § 604, HHS may disapprove the State's 
AFDC plan and withdraw federal financial participation from the 
State. HHS may also count AFDC payments made to families in 
violation of federal law and regulations in the State's payment 
error rate and impose heavy fiscal sanctions if the error rate 
exceeds federal standards. 45 C.F.R. § 205.44. 
When a noncustodial parent attempts to provide child 
support in a manner which interferes with the operation of the 
federal-state AFDC program mandates, the State Office of Recovery 
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Services has no alternative except to support, through whatever 
legal means are available, the laws enacted by Congress, the laws 
promulgated by HHS, and the state plan which has been accepted by 
the appropriate federal authorities. For the State ORS to do 
otherwise would seriously jeopardize the State's continued AFDC 
funding and risk significant federal sanctions. 
Because the Office of Recovery Services has obligations 
to the federal government to support the implementing laws for 
the AFDC program, it is extremely unfair for the Court to suggest 
that the Office has the luxury to decide in what cases it will 
pursue a "fundamental position [which] is sound." (Opinion, 
footnote 4, page 4.) Similarly, the Office of Recovery Services 
does not have the right, under current federal mandates, to 
decide in which instances it will "vindicatfe its] bureaucratic 
urges for uniformity and adherence to 'the rules'." (Opinion, 
page 4.) Federal law and implementing regulations require that 
the state agency maintain its uniformity and adherence to the law 
with respect to all welfare applicants and recipients and does 
not allow for the agency to make exceptions. See infra 45 C.F.R. 
S 233.20. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution in its equal protection and due process clauses also 
demands that the government agency charged with implementing a 
federal entitlements program do so in a manner which strictly 
complies with the guarantees of uniformity, equality, and 
adherence to the federal statutory requirements. 
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II. This Court has premised its decision on the 
misapprehension that the arrangement entered into by Mr. and Mrs, 
Adams was a "workable and working arrangement which benefitted 
all concerned, including the Department and the taxpayers it 
serves." (Opinion at page 5.) It is clear from the Court's 
opinion that its understanding of the operation of the AFDC 
program is fundamentally flawed. 
In support of the proposition espoused by the Court in 
i ts 1: 10] d ing, the Court offers footnote 5 which cites to the 
eligibility standards of the AFDC program ati well as its 
implementing state law The Court is of the mistaken impression, 
clearly iint:ounrt»-»n hy my si art* or federal law, that ""la]s Mrs. 
Adam's need increased due to an elevated rental payment, either 
because she lost the opportunity to occupy defendant's home at a 
suby n.diiL id! liiiir.uii i ( i i tin its irijj" rental value or was required 
to secure a comparable dwelling on the open market, her 
eligibility would increase, resulting in higher levels of public 
assistance." (Opinion, footnote l3 at paqe '"i * ) The Court's 
belief that a welfare applicant's grant increases depending upon 
her needs for rentf food, etc- is absolutely inaccurate and 
without any f oundatioi i i n ] a w A w elf are appJ i cant' s grant 
increases only when the assistance unit increases i n size (i.e., 
another ehxjLu is born). The grant does not increase when one's 
rent goes up or one's clothing cos ts 1 ncrease. 
Federal regulations which implement the AFDC program 
provide In pertinent par 11 
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A State Plan for . . . AFDC, . . must, as 
specified below: 
(1) General, (i) Provide that the 
determination of need and amount of 
assistance for all applicants and recipients 
will be made on an objective and equitable 
basis and all types of income will be taken 
into consideration in the same way except 
where otherwise specifically authorized by 
Federal statute. . . 
(2) Standards of assistance, (i) Specify a 
statewide standard, expressed in money 
amounts, to be used in determining (a) the 
need of applicants and recipients and (b) the 
amount of the assistance payment. . . 
(iii) Provide that the standard will be 
uniformly applied throughout the State except 
as provided under § 239.54 [which allows for 
a differential need standard if the recipient 
is appropriate to participate in a work 
incentive program] 
(iv) Include the method used in determining 
need and the amount of the assistance 
payment. . . . 
See 45 C.F.R. § 233.20. 
Based upon the foregoing federal law, the State of Utah 
has enacted legislation which states that AFDC may be provided to 
families and children in accordance with Title IV-A of the Social 
Security Act and the applicable federal regulations. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 62A-9-114(l) (1988). AFDC for any one household in 
any one month is determined by development of a standard needs 
budget which reflects the minimum needs of low-income households. 
The standard needs budget is the basis for determination of 
monthly assistance grants to recipient households for each fiscal 
year. See Utah Code Ann. § 62A-9-119(l) (1988). 
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.: :i * amount-a, effective as of July 1, 1989, 
are clearly -e- forth at state law found in Code of 
Administrative Regulations R810-213-306.1(14), For example, in 
the case ut aib. Adamw, ner H t .indcinl tjt. rnil h<u>r- after July 1, 
1989 would have been $387, assuming that her assistance unit was 
comprised of only three individuals, Mrs. Adams and her two 
children, (In fact, v - Adams ' assist; ill* :e \ in :i t may have been 
greater than three. ) This grant base Is a maximum amount and 
includes a standard financial component for housing; the grant 
base does not increase as the assistance unit s needs Increase.. 
When a public assistance recipient is receiving child 
suppor t, tl 3si stance recipient is also bound by the 
provisions of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act Federal 
regulations implementing Title IV-A and IV-D * the Social 
Secu ri ty Act require ili.ii I he State •• '* »• ive in effect a plan 
which specifies that 
[A]s a condition of eligibility for 
assistance, each applicant or recipient of 
AFDC shall assign to the State any rights to 
support from any other person as such 
applicant or recipient may have: (i) In his 
own behalf or in behalf of any other family 
member for whom the applicant or recipient is 
applying for or receiving assistance; and 
(ii) Which have accrued at the time such 
assignment is executed." 
45 C. F , K . J) 2 3 2 , 11 , See also: Utali (It x.1 e t\nn . p> 6 2 A - 9-
121(1) (1988) [Effective date, January 19, 1988, Laws of Utah 
1988, ch. 1, S 408 ] 
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Based upon the foregoing regulation, when Mrs. Adams 
became an applicant of AFDC assistance in 1988, she legally 
assigned to the Department her court-ordered right to receive 
$200/month in child support assistance from her husband, Mr. 
Adams. If Mr. Adams had been able to support his children in a 
manner which did not compel them to seek public assistance to 
maintain a subsistence standard of living, he may have been able 
to agree, with court approval, to an in-kind child support 
arrangement with his ex-wife. However, as a result of accepting 
the benefits of public assistance, Mrs. Adams, her children, and 
her ex-husband (through Mrs. Adams' assignment of support) also 
became subject to the burdens imposed by that federal 
entitlement, including the requirement to forward the court-
ordered child support obligation to the State of Utah. The 
Department's rights to collect child support from Mr. Adams is 
not limited to those support rights which Mrs. Adams herself 
possessed at the time she applied for AFDC. Utah law makes it 
clear that the Department's right to collect support from an 
obligor whose children are receiving public assistance is not 
affected by an agreement between the parents to settle or relieve 
any duty of support. Utah Code Ann. §§ 62A-9-121, 62A-11-307.2. 
The Department has independent rights and standing to recover 
support from the responsible parents of children receiving AFDC. 
The arrangement entered into by Mr. Adams and Mrs. 
Adams, contrary to the Court's opinion, benefits Mr. Adams and 
Mrs. Adams but damages the State and its taxpaying citizens. Mr. 
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Adams' check for $200 should have been forwarded to the State of 
Utah. If he paid his support in a timely fashion, the State 
would have sent to Mrs. Adams a $50 pass-through check as an 
incentive for Mr. Adams to timely pay his support. Because the 
amount of her grant exceeded her current child support court 
order, the State would retain the remainder of the $150 child 
support check and forward to Mrs. Adams a check for her grant 
amount of $387, leaving her a total of $437 to live on for the 
month at issue. See generally 45 C.F.R § 302.51. Mrs. Adams 
could then forward to Mr. Adams a check for $200—leaving him in 
the same position he was in before (except he would have to 
report rental income on his tax return) and leaving Mrs. Adams a 
total of $237 to provide her children with the other necessities 
2 
of life for that month. 
The lower court proposed that the State reduce Mrs. 
Adam's grant amount by $200. However, as already pointed out in 
the State's Brief, federal and state laws do not allow for such 
an alternative. (Brief, page 29-31) See also 45 C.F.R § 302.51. 
Under the Court of Appeals' opinion, Mrs. Adams is entitled to 
maintain a rental dwelling with a fair market value of $350/month 
as well as retain her AFDC grant of $387, leaving her with a 
clear windfall. This arrangement also leaves the State of Utah 
The State has no interest in the amount of rent that Mrs. Adams 
pays to her ex-husband for the rental unit she occupies. The 
parties would be free to make whatever rental agreement they 
chose. The IRS may have an interest in the specifics of their 
arrangement, but the Office of Recovery Services would have none. 
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(and the federal government) unreimbursed for $150/month ($200 
child support minus the $50 pass-through for a timely support 
payment). This Court is remiss in believing that such an 
arrangement works a benefit to the State or to the taxpayers of 
this State who help to fund the AFDC program through their state 
and federal tax obligations. 
The Court in its decision in this case sends a message 
to welfare applicants and to noncustodial parents to use "in-
kind" support as a means to circumvent the stringent laws 
established by Congress and HHS and to, in some unusual 
circumstances, thereby bolster the AFDC recipients' subsistence 
level. The consequence of this Court's opinion is that the Adams 
assistance unit is not forced to live on a subsistence-level AFDC 
grant (as are all other recipients who do not have an "in-kind" 
agreement). Such an arrangement may effectively encourage an 
AFDC recipient not to seek self-sufficiency and not to make an 
effort to become a taxpaying, non-welfare-dependent citizen of 
this State. The Adams' agreement works a clear benefit to the 
noncustodial parent by allowing him to maintain his equity in a 
rental unit, pay no out-of-pocket child support, and pay no taxes 
to the government for his rental income on that unit. There is 
no doubt that Mr. Adams is a winner in this arrangement and the 
government and taxpayers are the clear losers. Mrs. Adams also 
benefits from the Court's decision, but to the detriment of 
similarly situated welfare recipients who have a right to be 
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treated equally and fairly. 
A cursory reading of the federal and state laws 
implementing the AFDC program will demonstrate to the Court the 
complexity of the program. The volume and complexity of federal 
statutory and regulatory mandates does not grant a court the 
right to ignore those laws and substitute its own opinion of a 
more workable arrangement—a position taken by the court below. 
(Transcript of trial, September 14, 1989, pages 63-64). AFDC is 
not an easily administered program and human error is naturally a 
part of the program. However, in the United States, the AFDC 
program provides the only financial assistance available to many 
needy adults and children and it is the system which the State 
must administer and which the courts of this State must enforce. 
III. An award of attorneys's fees against the Office 
is clearly improper in light of the foregoing federal and state 
statutory mandates being followed by the Office in this case. 
This Court recognizes that the power to modify a 
divorce decree is one vested solely in the courts. (Opinion, 
page 3.) Until the commissioner and the judge in the lower court 
The Office of Recovery Services does not "act on behalf of Mrs. 
Adams" or have the obligation to protect the interest of Mrs. 
Adams and her children. (See Opinion, footnote 1, page 1; 
Opinion, page 4.) The Office has the responsibility to proceed 
on its own behalf, pursuant to federal and state statutory 
authority. The Office and the custodial parent do not share a 
joint interest. State of Utah v. Toledo, 699 P. 2d 710 (Utah 
1985). Similarly the Office of the Attorney General has no right 
to proceed on behalf of a private citizen, such as Mrs. Adams, 
but performs its constitutional and statutory responsibilities on 
behalf of its state agency clients, in this case, the Office of 
Recovery Services. 
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issued their orders in 1989, the support order in place since 
1979 had not been modified. In accordance with state and federal 
lawf the only order which the Office could enforce was the 1979 
order which Mrs. Adams had assigned to the Office upon her 
application for public assistance in 1988. While the tax 
intercept notice which was mailed during the course of the court 
proceedings was perhaps untimely, the due process requirements of 
the United States Constitution and implementing federal 
regulations specify that individuals affected by a government 
actions (such as tax intercepts and mandatory withholdings) be 
afforded formal notice of those actions in writing. "[P]olite 
letterfs] and phone call[s] suggesting different approaches]" do 
not meet constitutional guarantees of procedural due process. 
(Opinion, page 5.) 
Attorney's fees in this case are a relatively minor 
issue. However, if the Court withdraws its opinion and allows a 
rehearing, then clearly the imposition of fees is inappropriate 
and should be withdrawn. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Office of Recovery Services requests that this 
Court withdraw its decision dated January 28, 1991 and schedule a 
rehearing on this case. 
DATED this 4th day of February, 1991. 
LINDA LUINSTRA 
Assistant Attorney General 
Division Chief, Human Services 
Division 
Mailing Certificate 
I hereby certify that on the 4th day of February, 1991, 
I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing 
Petition for Rehearing to the following: 
Scott Holt 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
44 North Main 
Layton, Utah 84041 
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